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Abstract
We estimate the unrecorded economy in 49 economies from 1981 to 2005. Our study is based
on electricity consumption series which are ltered to account for technological change and for the
changing weight of the energy-intensive industrial sector. In contrast with studies based on the
MIMIC method, we obtain a reduction in the weight of the unobserved economy. Unlike La Porta
and Shleifer (2008), we identify measures of institutional quality which are signicantly related
to the shadow economy even after controlling for per-capita GDP. Thus the shadow economy
should not be dismissed as the unpleasant side e¤ect of underdevelopment. Instead it is related
to some specic institutional aspects that may well survive even when the economy reaches
higher development stages. We identify strong substitution e¤ects between o¢ cial and uno¢ cial
sectors both in the long run and over the business cycle. This has important implications for
income convergence and for the relationship between volatility and growth.
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1 Introduction
The unobserved or shadow economy accounts for between a third and a half of total GDP in
developing countries (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). Even in developed countries like Italy and
Spain, recent estimates set the weight of the shadow economy at around 20% (DellAnno, 2003;
Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio, 2005). Economists disagree about the determinants and the
e¤ects of the uno¢ cial sector. De Soto (1989, 2000) argues that excessive taxes and regulations
conne rms to the fringe of markets, limiting access to public goods and wasting their productive
potential. Others (Farrell, 2004; Farrell, Baily and Remes, 2005) see informal rms as gaining a
substantial cost advantage relative to o¢ cial rms. Finally, La Porta and Shleifer (2008) look at
the formal and informal sectors as two parallel economies, where the ine¢ cient informal sector is
bound to recede when growth-enhancing policies raise the quality of the public goods accessible to
o¢ cial rms.
Empirical analysis is obviously crucial for a better understanding of the phenomenon. Re-
searchers 1 who adopt the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) latent variable method
represent the shadow economy in terms of two sets of variables, respectively labeled as "causal vari-
ables" (taxation, regulatory burden, attitudes toward the state) and "likely indicators" (changes in
the demand for currency, in the labour force participation rate and in o¢ cial GDP). Studies based
on this approach report that the shadow economy has been on the rise since the 1990s (Schneider
and Enste, 2000). The method has been criticized because the choice of "causal variables" and
"likely e¤ects" appears arbitrary (Helberger and Knepel, 1988; Smith, 2002; Hill, 2002; Breusch,
2005). Moreover, the use of variables like taxes and government regulation as determinants of the
unrecorded economy leads to almost tautological results when one interprets the obtained estimates
on the grounds of economic and institutional factors. Consider for instance the set of variables
that identify a countrys institutional quality (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). These are
also typically related to the size of the public sector and to market regulation. Thus, measures of
the unrecorded economy based on these two latter variables are bound to exhibit correlations with
measures of institutional quality found in Torgler and Schneider (2007).
1Loayza, 1996; Giles, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider, 2003; Giles, Tedds and Werkneh,
2003; Tedds and Giles, 2002; DellAnno, 2003; Bajada and Schneider, 2005; Schneider, 2004, 2005, 2008; Alañón and
Gómez-Antonio, 2005; Buehn, Karmann and Schneider, 2007; DellAnno, Gómez-Antonio and Alañón-Pardo, 2007;
Brambila-Macias, 2008.
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Alternatively, the Electricity Consumption (EC) approach does not require theoretical priors
on the causes of the unobserved economy. In fact, it obtains the shadow economy as the di¤erence
between an estimate of total (observed and unobserved) GDP growth and o¢ cial GDP gures.
Estimates of total GDP growth are directly inferred from electricity consumption growth by impos-
ing a constant electricity-consumption-to-GDP ratio. This assumption has been widely criticized
(Lacko 1998, 1999; Hanousek and Palda, 2006) because it implies that the size of the informal
economy will be biased down by energy-saving technological progress. Some authors have therefore
chosen ad hoc country-specic values for the ratio of electricity consumption to GDP (Kaufmann
and Kaliberda, 1996; Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997). More recently, Chong and Gradstein
(2007) impose a 5% per-decade decrease in the elasticity of electricity consumption to GDP for all
countries. Unfortunately, their method in several cases generates negative values for the relative
size of the unrecorded economy (see our discussion in Section 3 below). This inevitably weakens
the robustness of their conclusions about the institutional determinants of the shadow economy.
In the paper we obtain measures of the shadow economy which, unlike MIMIC estimates, are
independent from theoretical priors and yet avoid the ad hoc assumptions that plague previous
applications of the EC method. To begin with, note that the overall e¤ects of technological change
on electricity consumption are in fact ambiguous. The JevonsParadox suggests that the role of
energy-saving innovations is probably limited (Jevons, 1865, 1965; Iorgulescu and Polimeni, 2007;
Polimeni and Iorgulescu, 2007). In addition, labour-saving innovations are likely to increase energy
consumption. Finally, variations in the weight of the energy-intensive industrial sector should also
a¤ect electricity consumption. We therefore apply a version of the Modied Total Electricity (MTE)
approach proposed by Eilat and Zinnes (2002). This involves a two-stages procedure. In the rst
stage the series of electricity consumption growth is ltered to remove the inuence of changes in
the weight of the industry sector and in the relative electricity prices. Empirical studies (Popp,
2001, 2002; Linn, 2008) show that energy-saving technological change is mainly driven by changes
in energy prices, whereas autonomous innovations play a lesser role. In the second stage, the growth
rate of the shadow economy is obtained by subtracting the growth rate of the o¢ cial economy from
the ltered series of electricity consumption growth - where the latter proxies the growth rate of
the overall economy.
We consider 49 economies over the period 1981-2005. Since the time series dimension of the
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panel is signicantly long, the choice of the econometric methodology is based on a preliminary
analysis about the stationarity and cointegration of the variables. The application of panel unit
root and cointegration techniques is an important innovative aspect of this study.
Our estimates provide a suggestive and novel description of the dynamics of the shadow economy,
in contrast with pre-existing results. On the one hand, we nd that the relative size of the shadow
economy has decreased for most countries during the last decades. On the other hand, even if we
observe a negative and statistically signicant correlation between annual growth rates of o¢ cial
GDP and the share of unrecorded income, we identify measures of institutional quality which are
signicantly correlated to the shadow economy even after controlling for the e¤ect of per-capita GDP.
This latter result, in sharp contrast with La Porta and Shleifer (2008), suggests that the shadow
economy should not be dismissed as the unpleasant side e¤ect of economic underdevelopment.
Instead it is related to some specic institutional aspects that may well survive even when the
economy reaches higher development stages. Finally, our method allows for the rst time to compute
cyclical gaps in the o¢ cial and unrecorded GDP gures. In line with the theoretical model of Busato
and Chiarini (2004), we nd evidence of a double business cycle, where the correlation between the
two gaps is negative and statistically signicant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and denes
the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the results. In Section 4 we conclude and discuss the
debate on income convergence and the relationship between volatility and growth.
2 Model identication, data description and econometric method-
ology
Any attempt to exploit electricity consumption to estimate the shadow economy should address
the issue of the empirical stability of the energy-consumption-to-GDP ratio. Critics of the EC
approach emphasize the potential downward bias caused by energy-saving technological change.
The argument is straightforward and quite intuitive, but it neglects a long-standing debate on the
JevonsParadox: it cannot be taken for granted that energy-saving technological change will reduce
the energy intensity of aggregate production (Jevons, 1865, 1965). In fact, computable general
equilibrium models support the view that energy consumption might "rebound" because energy
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demand is at best weakly correlated with a more e¢ cient energy use. The reason why this might
happen is easily explained. Following an improvement in energy e¢ ciency, market forces drive some
countervailing e¤ects: (i) the fall in energy prices triggers a substitution e¤ect towards more energy-
intensive goods and production techniques; (ii) the income e¤ect raises household consumption of all
commodities, including energy consumption. The issue ultimately is an empirical one. Simulations
in Grant, Hanley, McGregor, Swales and Turner (2007) obtain a rebound e¤ect between 30 and
50%. 2 In addition, the downward bias might be o¤set by other forms of technological change, such
as labor-saving innovations, which increase the energy intensity of the production function. For
instance, early econometric work has shown that in the US manufacturing sector technical change
has been energy intensive (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1981; Hogan and Jorgenson, 1991). Finally,
one should bear in mind that sectoral specialization might change as the economy develops, thereby
a¤ecting the energy intensity of production.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that changes in the domestic real price of electricity 3
capture the e¤ects of supply shocks and of long term e¢ ciency gains caused by technical change,
whereas changes in the industry share of GDP a¤ect the component of electricity consumption
which is directly related to the country-specic evolution in the composition of domestic output.
The rst stage of our application of the MTE procedure is therefore based on the following equation:
Eleci;t = i + 1Epricei;t + 2IndGdpi;t + "i;t (1)
where subscripts t; i are time and country indexes, Elec, Eprice and IndGdp respectively
describe annual percentage changes in electricity consumption, in the real price of electricity and in
the industry share of GDP. 4
Once the relative-price and demand-composition e¤ects have been identied, the residual changes
in electricity consumption, Elecres, may be used as a proxy for the growth rate in the overall
(recorded and unrecorded) economic activity:
2Dimitropoulos (2007) reports stronger rebound e¤ects.
3The use of relative electricity prices obviously raises endogeneity problems. We address them in Appendix I below.
4Eilat and Zinnes (2002) also consider the private sector share of total GDP, in order to capture privatization
e¤ects in transition economies. This additional factor is therefore not important for our panel, which includes only
six transition economies.
5
Elecresi;t = Eleci;t   [1Epricei;t + 2IndGdpi;t] (2)
Then, the growth rate of the unrecorded economy, SH, is obtained as follows:
SHi;t = Elec
res
i;t  Gdpi;t (3)
where Gdp denotes the o¢ cial GDP growth rate. Finally, by applying SH to pre-existing
base-year estimates, we obtain our measures of the unrecorded economy as a share of o¢ cial GDP.5
Panel composition, 49 economies6 over the period 1981-2005, depends on the availability of
data about electricity consumption, electricity price and share of industry.7 Data on electricity
consumption, real price of electricity, share of industrial income and o¢ cial GDP have been obtained
from Energy Information Administration, International Energy Agency, World Bank and United
Nations, respectively (see Appendix II).
Since the time series dimension of the panel is relatively long, the econometric methodology is
based on a preliminary stationarity and cointegration analysis of the relevant variables. Variables
Elec, Eprice, IndGdp exhibit non stationarity, tested using Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003),
Pesaran (2003, 2007), Hadri (2000), Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992), ADF and
Phillips-Perron unit root tests (see Appendix I for details). A cointegrating relationships between
Elec, Eprice and IndGdp has been, therefore, detected using the residual-based procedure
developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004).
Due to the presence of cointegrated time series, in our estimate of equation (1) we use the
group-mean panel Fully Modied Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method proposed by Pedroni
(2000, 2001).8
5We have adopted the estimates of Johnson et al. (1997)- for the transition economies- and Lacko (1996, 1998)-
for the OECD and Developing countries. The base-year estimate for Tanzania is from Bagachwa and Nasho (1995).
6Countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Co sta Rica, Czech R., Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak R., Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Tunisia, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
7Due to lack of some observations about electricity consumption and the industry share, we have ruled out some of
the countries for which base-year macroelectric gures were available: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Cyprus, Mauritius, and Nigeria.
8See Appendix I for a detailed description of our econometric methodology.
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3 Results
To gauge the relevance of the ltering procedure (2), in Figure 7 (Appendix III) we plot for each
country the cumulated series for Elecres and Elec, starting from a common base (1981=100). It
is easy to see that substantial and persistent di¤erences exist for 50% of the countries in the panel.
In Figure 8 (Appendix III), we provide a comparison between the EC and our MTE estimates. The
MTE estimates obtained by ltering out separately the changes in electricity prices- MTE_P- and
changes in output composition- MTE_I- are also reported. In some countries important di¤erences
between the two methods arise as a consequence of the changing weight of the industry share. In
fact, we observe that in transition countries the standard EC method underestimates the relative
size of unobserved sector after the end of communism, when the industry share of GDP decreased.
A similar di¤erence is detected in countries like Hong Kong, Italy and Japan, where the service
sector as a percentage of GDP has signicantly increased during the last decades. By contrast, the
development process in countries like Thailand corresponds to an increase in the industry share of
GDP. In this case the EC method overestimates the relative size of the unobserved sector. The
relative price e¤ect in energy consumption seems to play a lesser role: we could nd important
di¤erences only for South Korea.
Table 1 presents the cross country distribution of the shadow economy (SH) and documents
changes relative to the initial sample period.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the MTE estimates (% GDP)
Country SH 2001 2005  Country SH 2001 2005 
AU 9:1  8:9 KR 23:1  52:6
AT 10:9  5:3 MY 24:2  22:3
BE 17:9  7:5 MA 37:8  10:1
BW 18:9  63 MX 38:5  2:2
BG 31:8  7:9 NL 9:9  6:6
BR 26:7  3:5 NO 4:3  6:5
CA 6:8  7:2 PA 21:1  17:6
CL 22:1  24:4 PY 36:2 15:6
CO 18:3  19:1 PE 30:1  3:5
CR 19:8  18:7 PH 46:2  2:7
CZ 6:2 0:5 PL 12:7  10:8
DK 12:3  7:2 PT 16  4:5
EG 49:1  46:7 RO 14:1 0:4
FI 11  4:7 SG 5:8  12:6
FR 10:4  3:7 SK 5:3  0:5
DE 10:9  8 ES 19:7  11:1
GR 17:4  1:3 LK 28:9  16:6
GT 56:7 9:5 SE 7:4  4:6
HK 10:5  6:4 CH 9:4  2:1
HU 29:4  6:2 TZ 16:7  39:2
IE 6:4  19:6 TH 50:4  68:1
IL 18:8  14:1 TN 31:5  12:7
IT 20:9  0:1 GB 8:5  9:5
JP 13:7  4:2 US 6:1  7:6
VE 27:8 0:4
Note:  = SH 2001 2005-SH 1981 1985
Source: own calculations.
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Our results are in sharp contrast with those obtained under the MIMIC method (Schneider,
2004, 2005, reported in Figure 9, Appendix III). In fact, we nd that the relative importance of
the unrecorded economy has fallen in all countries with the exceptions of Guatemala, characterized
by an increase, and a small group of countries where SH was substantially stable (Italy, Romania,
Venezuela, the Czech and Slovak Republics). In Figure 9, we also report shadow economy estimates
obtained by Chong and Gradstein (2007) who adopt the EC method but impose a 5% per-decade
decrease in the elasticity of electricity consumption to GDP. 9 It is interesting to note that, for all
their emphasis on energy-saving technical change, in several countries our estimates document a
smaller reduction in SH.
To cross-check the plausibility of our results, we adopt a "narrative" approach, investigating
whether episodes of institutional change, economic crisis and reform might be associated to the
country-specic patterns of the unobserved economy emerging from our estimates. In Appendix
IV, we provide a detailed description of our ndings. As an example, it is interesting to discuss
here the case of transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia), where our estimates depict a "hump-shaped" pattern for the dynamics of the shadow
economy following the fall of the communist regime in 1989. The observed initial increase might
be due to the economic and institutional disarray that followed the collapse of communism. The
subsequent reversal might be related to consolidation of the state and to market-oriented reforms,
based on price- and trade-liberalization measures, that were undertaken during the 1990s. 10
In Table 2 we document some basic dynamic panel correlations of our estimates with measures
of development and o¢ cial output volatility. A widely cited stylized fact is that the share of
the unrecorded economy is inversely related to the stage of economic development (Amaral and
Quintin, 2006). The theoretical model of Loayza and Rigolini (2006) supports this views and also
suggests that the share of the shadow economy should exhibit a countercyclical pattern. A similar
conclusion about the cyclical substitutability between o¢ cial and unrecorded activities obtains in
9The Chong and Gradstein (2007) method yields negative shares of the unrecorded economy in Canada, Norway,
Poland, Romania and Sweden. These gures were kindly supplied by Alberto Chong.
10Our results are quite similar to those obtained for transition countries by Feige and Urban (2008) using essentially
similar methods. As noted by these authors, over the decades examined in our analysis, GDP accounting might have
improved, reducing the amount of unrecorded income simply because of better and more inclusive national accounting
techniques. Indeed, improved national income accounting could explain the declines in our estimated unrecorded
income. Nevertheless, adding to our estimates the percentages of imputed unobserved income reported in Feige and
Urban (2008), we found that, except for Romania in the years 1994-1996 and Slovakia in 1996, the two series follow
similar dynamics.
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the theoretical model of Busato and Chiarini (2004). In fact, we found that changes in SH correlate
negatively with yearly growth rates of o¢ cial GDP, and positively with standard development
indicators such as the relative weight of agricultural production and the percentage of active labor
force that is self-employed. 11 Finally, we computed cyclical gaps in the o¢ cial and unrecorded
GDP gures 12, obtaining evidence of a double business cycle,where the correlation between the two
gaps is negative and statistically signicant. As an example, Figure 1 plots o¢ cial and unrecorded
output gaps for United States.
Table 2- Correlation analysis
Correlation coe¢ cients
 Share unrecorded income-O¢ cial GDP growth  0:55  
Share unrecorded income-Share agricultural income 0:46  
Share unrecorded income-Share self-employment 0:63  
Uno¢ cial output gap-O¢ cial output gap13  0:39  
Note: * signicant at the 10% level; ** signicant at the 5% level; *** signicant at the 1% level.
Figure 1- O¢ cial and unrecorded output gaps- United States
-.0
4
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2
0
.0
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.0
4
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year
official output gap unrecorded output gap
11As noted by Loayza and Rigolini (2006), in most developing countries there is a strong correlation between
unobserved activity and self-employment, as most self employed tend to be low-skilled, unregistered workers.
12The two gaps are obtained detrending the series of unobserved economy and o¢ cial GDP by using the Hodrick-
Prescott lter.
13Czech and Slovak Republics are outliers and, therefore, excluded from this analysis.
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3.1 Interpreting cross-country di¤erences, preliminary results
La Porta and Shleifer (2008) group the determinants of the size of the uno¢ cial economy into three
broad categories: the cost of becoming formal, the cost of staying formal, and the benets of be-
ing formal. Then, having identied proxies for these three categories, they explore cross-country
correlations with several measures of the shadow economy. They nd that most estimated coe¢ -
cients fall in value and lose signicance after controlling for per-capita GDP. This latter variable,
in turn, is strongly signicant. Their interpretation of this result is that the informal economy is a
manifestation of underdevelopment, which recedes as the economy develops.
We adopt a similar approach, investigating whether measures of "institutional quality" may
explain our estimates of the shadow economy. It should be noted from the outset that we are
strongly constrained by data availability. In fact several measures of the costs and benets from
being formal are discontinuous and available only for the latter part of our sample. We cannot
therefore exploit the time series dimension of the panel. To limit endogeneity problems the regres-
sors14 are predetermined to the measures of the shadow economy which, in turn, are restricted to
the 2001-2005 averages in order to overlap with the sample period in La Porta and Shleifer (2008).
Since the number of country observations limits our degrees of freedom, we are forced to use existing
syntethic measures of the pros and cons of informality, such as the "Index of Business Freedom"
(IBF ) and the "Index of Trade Freedom" (ITF ). We also account for a specic measure of the cost
of being formal, i.e the log number of procedures required to enforce a contract (log PROC ). In
addition, the benets of formality may be captured by measures of government e¢ ciency such as
the "Index of Electoral Competition" (IEC ) and an index of government stability (STABS ). We
also expect that the level of human capital (captured by the variable EDU ) is inversely related to
the weight of the shadow economy because more educated workers are less likely to be employed by
the less productive rms that operate informally. To control for the stage of economic development
we include the log of per-capita income (log GDP).
All our measures of institutional quality (except for IEC ) are signicantly related to the shadow
economy and exhibit the expected signs (Table 3). Unlike La Porta and Shleifer (2008) our results
survive after controlling for the e¤ect of per capita GDP. This suggests that the shadow economy
14See Appendix II for a detailed description of the data.
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should not be dismissed as the unpleasant side e¤ect of economic underdevelopment. Instead it is
related to some specic institutional aspects that may well survive even when the economy reaches
higher development stages. To support intuition, in Figure 2 we show that, among OECD economies,
countries like Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are characterized by a relatively higher
share of unrecorded income. 15 Other less developed economies, such as Tanzania and Botswana,
benet from relatively good institutional quality and are characterized by a relatively small weight
of the shadow economy. 16
15Not surprisingly, these countries are also characterized by much worse average scores for IBF and log PROC.
16The Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness is equal to 7 for Tanzania and Botswana. This is the largest
possible score, given that the largest party got less than 75% (see Appendix II). Similarly, the measure of political
stability is equal to 0 for both countries. This refers to the highest level of stability.
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Table 3- OLS regressions with robust standard errors
Dependent variable: unrecorded economy (% of o¢ cial GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IBF  0:67    0:4    0:39    0:43    0:34    0:27  0:29  
ITF  0:57    0:61    0:53    0:43    0:28    0:33  
STABS 0:16   0:16   0:17   0:1   0:1  
IEC  0:01  0:01  0:01  0:009
log PROC 0:16   0:16   0:16  
EDU  0:12  0:16
log GDP 0:01
Note: regressions with constant terms and robust standard errors (not reported).
* signicant at the 10% level. ** signicant at the 5% level.*** signicant at the 1% level.
Figure 2- Unobserved economy and GDP per capita- 2001-2005
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4 Conclusions and extensions
We challenge two established views, i.e. that the shadow economy has been on a rising trend over
the last decades and that it is inevitably bound to recede with economic development. In fact we
show that for most countries the relative size of the unobserved economy has decreased. In addition,
we nd that cross country di¤erences remain correlated to measures of institutional quality even
after controlling for the stage of economic development.
Our analysis has identied strong substitution e¤ects between o¢ cial and uno¢ cial sectors both
in the long run - when the share of the unrecorded economy is inversely related to o¢ cial output
growth - and over the business cycle. This implies an upward bias in o¢ cial gures concerning per
capita income growth (Figure 3). The scatter diagram reported in Figure 4 shows that this bias is
stronger for poorer countries, suggesting that established results on per capita income convergence
should be reconsidered.
A similar conclusion applies to empirical analyses of the link between output volatility and
growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004; Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and
Manova, 2005; Chatterjee and Shukayev, 2006). For each country we computed the volatility of
total (observed plus unobserved) output growth for each country, nding that it is lower than o¢ cial
output growth volatility in 43 out of the 49 countries (Figure 5). 17 Figure 6 shows that the negative
correlation between growth and volatility is much stronger if we take into account our estimates of
the unrecorded economy.
Finally, since we use a measurement method which is not based on theoretical priors concerning
the role of taxes and market regulations, our estimates pave the way for an investigation of the
institutional determinants of the shadow economy. This is left for future research.
17The remaining 6 countries are Austria, Egypt, Guatemala, Paraguay, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.
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Figure 3- O¢ cial and total per capita GDP growth- 1981-2005
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Figure 5- O¢ cial and total output growth volatility- 1981-2005
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Figure 6- Output growth volatility and output growth- 1981-2005
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5 Appendix I- Econometric Methodology
5.1 Panel stationary tests
The stationarity of the variables Elec, Eprice and IndGdp has been initially tested adopting
the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) methodology for the null of unit root in heterogeneous panels.
This test is based on the hypothesis that the error terms are independent across cross-sections and
may su¤er from size distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence (Im, Pesaran and
Shin, 2003). Therefore, to support the result of the IPS test, we performed the Pesaran (PES)
test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-sectional dependence (Pesaran, 2003, 2007).
18 Since these two tests reject the null of unit root even if only one series is stationary, we also
performed the Hadri test for the null of stationarity in heterogeneous panels. This test rejects the
null of stationarity even if only one series is not stationary and it is based on the assumption of
cross-sectional independence of the error terms (Hadri, 2000). 19 Thus, to support the results of
the Hadri test, we have nally performed separate Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992)
(KPSS), ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests.
Table 4 reports the results of the IPS and Pesaran tests. The null of unit root for all variables
is rejected against the alternative hypothesis that at least one series is stationary.
18We have performed a truncated version of the CADF statistics which has nite rst and second order moments.
Pesaran (2003) suggests replacing extreme values of the test statistics by K1 or K2 such that Pr [-K1 < ti (N,T) <
K2] is su¢ ciently large, namely in excess of 0.9999. As noted by Pesaran, this truncated test statistic allows to avoid
size distortions, especially in the case of models with residual serial correlations and linear trends.
19Giulietti, Otero and Smith (2006) demonstrate that the Hadri test may su¤er from size distortions in the presence
of cross-sectional dependence when N=50 and T=25. However, also their alternative Bootstrap Hadri Test may su¤er
from size distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence when N=50 and T=25.
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Table 4- Panel unit root test
H0: all 49 timeseries in the panel are non-stationary processes; H1: at least one series is stationary
 =individual linear trends
IPS PES IPS() PES()
EC  14:6  11:9  13  10:3
PE  12:3  9:2  13:9  5:2
I  15:7  12:5  11:9  9:4
Note: The statistics are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal with a left hand side rejection
area. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at least at the 5 percent level of
signicance.
The results of the Hadry test are reported in Table 5. The statistics indicate that there is
evidence of non stationarity for all variables Elec, Eprice and IndGdp.
Table 5- Hadri panel stationary test
H0: all 49 timeseries in the panel are stationary processes; H1: at least one series is not stationary
Homo: homoskedastic errors across countries; Hetero: heteroskedastic errors across countries; SerDep:
serial dependence in the errors
 =individual linear trends
Z() Z ()
EC Homo 1:9 0:4
EC Hetero 4:8 4:6
EC SerDep 5:5 18:8
PE Homo 14:8  3
PE Hetero 10:4 2:9
PE SerDep 8:9 21:3
I Homo  1:3 2:8
I Hetero 0:9 3
I SerDep 2:7 17:3
Note: The statistics are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal with a right hand side rejection
area. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity at least at the 5 percent level of
signicance.
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Finally, according to the separate KPSS, ADF and PP unit root tests, a signicant portion of
series of each relevant variable have a unit root.
The di¤erenced series Elec, Eprice and IndGdp are stationary.
5.2 Cointegration statistics
With non-stationary pooled time series, the application of the OLS estimator may result in biased
and inconsistent estimates (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Engle and Granger, 1987). To dene an
appropriate estimator for equation (1), it has been therefore necessary to turn to panel cointegration
techniques. The presence of cointegrating relationships between Elec, Eprice and IndGdp has
been tested using the residual-based procedure developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004). 20 The Pedroni
group tests have a null of no cointegration for all countries of the panel against the alternative
hypothesis of cointegration for at least one country. Table 6 reports the results. All Pedroni group-
statistics reject the null of no cointegration. These tests are based on the assumption of errors
cross-sectional independence. As noted by Pedroni (2004), common time dummies can be included
in the regression equation in order to eliminate some forms of cross-sectional dependence. 21 As
Table 6 shows, including time dummies our results are conrmed. The null of no cointegration is
rejected by all group statistics.
20Pedroni (2004) uses these cointegration tests for testing the purchasing power parity for the post-Bretton Woods
period. In particular, he uses a panel of 25 countries for the period June 1973-December 1994 and reports the results
for both annual, T=20, and monthly, T=246, data.
21As noted by Pedroni (2004), for many cases this approach may be appropriate, as, for example, when common
business cycle shocks impact the data for all individuals of the panel together. In other cases, additional cross-sectional
dependencies may exist in the form of relatively persistent dynamic feedback e¤ects that run from one country to
another and that are not common across countries, in which case common time e¤ects will not account for all the
dependency. If the time series dimension is long enough relative to the cross-sectional dimension, the one practical
solution in such cases may be to employ a GLS approach based on the estimation of the panel-wide asymptotic
covariance for the weighting matrix. Most recently, Gengenbach, Palm and Urbain (2006) propose a common factor
structure to model the cross-sectional dependence for panel no-cointegration tests. Moreover, a bootstrap test for the
null hypothesis of cointegration in panel data is presented by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007).
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Table 6- Pedroni residual-based cointegration test
H0: no cointegration for all countries; H1: for at least one country there is cointegration;
Group statistics No time dummies Time dummies
Rho  statistic  10:8  10:5
PP   statistic  24  24:3
ADF   statistic  17:8  19:5
Note: All reported values are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. The Pedroni tests are
left-sided. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5 per cent
level of signicance.
The Pedroni cointegration test statistics may su¤er from size distortions when the time dimen-
sion of the panel is not signicantly large with respect to the cross sectional dimension (Pedroni,
2004). Therefore, the same cointegration analysis has been applied to seven subgroups of the panel
with T>N. 22 These additional tests conrm the initial results. The null of no cointegration is
always rejected. However, the test of Pedroni rejects the null of no cointegration even if the resid-
uals of a pooled OLS estimation of equation (1) are stationary only for one country. Therefore, to
determine whether the residuals of each of the 49 cross-sections of equation (1) are stationary we
have performed separate ADF, Phillips-Perron and KPSS unit root tests. These values demonstrate
that the OLS residuals are stationary for a signicant portion of countries. In particular, there is
evidence of non-stationarity in the residuals only for two countries, Canada and Hungary.
Due to the presence of cointegrated time series, for the estimation of equation (1) we have
used the group-mean panel Fully Modied Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method proposed
by Pedroni (2000, 2001). The group-mean FMOLS estimator allows for the heterogeneity of the
panel and adjusts for the e¤ects of autocorrelation of the errors. This estimator also adjusts for the
potential long-run endogeneity of the regressors.
In order to eliminate some forms of cross-sectional dependence, we have also included in the
regression common time dummies (Pedroni, 2000, 2001). Table 7 reports the estimation results.
The group-FMOLS estimates suggest that - considering the entire panel of 49 countries- a positive
22We have tested the presence of cointegration in 20 highly industrialized OECD countries, 16 European countries,
6 Transition countries, and 23 non OECD countries countries: 10 Latin American countries, 5 African countries, and
8 Asian countries.
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and statistically signicant relationship exists between the changes in electric consumption and
those in the share of industry. On the contrary, a negative and statistically signicant relationship
exists between the changes in electric consumption and those in electricity price. 23
As noted by Pedroni (2000), the group-mean FMOLS estimator may su¤er from size distortions
when N is large relative to T. 24 Thus, we have estimated the same regression equation considering
four subgroups of countries with T large relative to N. 25 As Table 7 shows, including or not common
time dummies, these results are close to those obtained examining the entire panel of countries. Only
for the non OECD economies, the relationship between the changes in electric consumption and
those in electricity price becomes positive and non-statistically signicant in the presence of time
dummies26.
23To use changes in country-specic electricity price as an explanatory variable for changes in electricity consumption
may generate problems of endogeneity. Firstly, we have re-estimated equation (1) adopting an alternative more
exogenous real price of energy for 26 OECD countries and a global index of energy price for the remaining 23
countries (see Appendix II for a description of the data). Second, we have used the global price of energy for the
entire panel. In both situations we have obtained the same result. There is a positive and statistically signicant
relationship between changes in electricity consumption and changes in industry share of GDP. There is a negative
and statistically signicant relationship between changes in electricity usage and changes in the price of energy.
24Using Monte Carlo simulations, Pedroni (2000) demonstrates that, in the bivariate case, the small sample distor-
tion of the group-mean fully modied OLS estimator tends to be high when N > T, and decreases as T > N. This is
a practical consequence of any xed e¤ects model.
25We have employed the FMOLS estimation for 20 highly industrialized OECD countries, 16 European countries,
22 European countries (including 6 Transition countries), and 23 non OECD countries (African, Asian and Latin
American countries).
26The residual changes in electricity consumption are therefore stationary. To prove that also the dynamics of
unrecorded income follow a stationary process, we have tested the stationarity of the annual changes in o¢ cial GDP,
Gdp. We have found a strong evidence of stationarity.
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Table 7- FMOLS estimation
TD = Time dummies
Dep Var EC I PE I (TD) PE (TD)
Entirepanel 0:88  0:09 0:84  0:02
OECD 0:70  0:10 0:76  0:05
European 0:78  0:10 0:79  0:06
European 0:83  0:10 0:80  0:08
NonOECD 1:03  0:08 0:79 0:07
Note: t-stats (not reported) are for H0 : i = 0 for all i vs H1 : i 6= 0 for all i. A * indicates the
rejection of the null hypothesis of stationarity at least at the 5 percent level of signicance.
European indicate European countries including Transition economies; NonOECD indicate non
OECD countries excluding Transition economies.
In the paper, we present results based on country-specic FMOLS estimators for equation (1).27
27We have also computed residual electricity consumption series using both the full panel FMOLS coe¢ cients
and separate subpanel coe¢ cients (highly industrialized OECD non European, European, and Developing countries)
reported in Table 7. The three series computed for electricity usage are quite similar (results available upon request).
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6 Appendix II- description of data
6.1 Panel analysis
Total Electricity Consumption (kWh). Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA).
This variable is obtained as the Net Total Electricity Generation plus Electricity Imports minus
Electricity Exports minus Electricity Distribution Losses. We used this variable for 46 countries.
Total Final Electricity Consumption (ktoe). Source: International Energy Agency (IEA).
This variable reects the sum of the electricity consumption in the end-use sectors. Electricity
used for transformation and for own use of the energy producing industries is excluded. Due to
the lack of complete information, we used this variable- instead of Total Electricity Consumption
(source: EIA)- for Germany, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Data for pre-unication Germany include
electricity consumption in the Democratic Republic of Germany.
Index of Electricity End-Use Prices. Source: International Energy Agency (IEA). To
calculate this real price index, the nominal prices were deated with country-specic producer price
indices for the industry sector and with country-specic consumer price indices for the household
sector. We used this country-specic index for 26 OECD countries.
OECD Index of Electricity End-Use Prices. Source: International Energy Agency (IEA).
This variable is the aggregate Index of Electricity End-Use Prices for 26 OECD countries.
World Index of Energy Prices. Source: World Bank (WB), Commodity Price Data. For
23 countries- for which country-specic data on electricity prices were not available- the relative
electricity prices were proxied by this global index of real energy price.
Industrial Income. Source: United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). Constant (1990)
prices- US Dollars.
O¢ cial GDP. Source: United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD).Constant (1990) prices- US
Dollars.
Agricultural Income. Source: United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). Constant (1990)
prices- US Dollars.
Self-employment. Source: International Labour Organization (ILO).
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6.2 Cross-section analysis (Table 3)
Index of Business Freedom (IBF). Source: Heritage Foundation. Business freedom is a quan-
titative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a business that represents the overall
burden of regulation, as well as the e¢ ciency of government in the regulatory process. The busi-
ness freedom score for each country is a number between 0 and 100, with 100 equaling the freest
business environment. The score is based on 10 factors, all weighted equally, using data from the
World Banks Doing Business study:
 Starting a business- procedures (number);
 Starting a business- time (days);
 Starting a business- cost (% of income per capita);
 Starting a business- minimum capital (% of income per capita);
 Obtaining a license- procedures (number);
 Obtaining a license- time (days);
 Obtaining a license- cost (% of income per capita);
 Closing a business- time (days);
 Closing a business- cost (% of estate);
 Closing a business- recovery rate (cents on the dollar).
Each of these raw factors is converted to a scale of 0 to 100, after which the average of the
converted values is computed. The result represents the countrys business freedom score.
Each factor is converted to a 0 to 100 scale using the following equation:
Factor Scorei = 50 factoraverage = factori
which is based on the ratio of the country data for each factor relative to the world average,
multiplied by 50.
In the paper we used the average values of IBF for the period 1997-2001.
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Index of Trade Freedom (ITF). Source: Heritage Foundation. Trade freedom is a composite
measure of the absence of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers that a¤ect imports and exports of goods and
services. The trade freedom score is based on two inputs:
 The trade-weighted average tari¤ rate
 Non-tari¤ barriers (NTBs).
The weighted average tari¤ uses weights for each tari¤ based on the share of imports for each
good. Weighted average tari¤s are a purely quantitative measure and account for the basic calcu-
lation of the score using the following equation:
TradeFreedomi = (((Tariffmax   Tariffi)=(Tariffmax   Tariffmin))  100) NTBi
where Trade Freedomi represents the trade freedom in country i, Tariffmax and Tariffmin
represent the upper and lower bounds for tari¤ rates (%), and Tariffi represents the weighted
average tari¤ rate (%) in country i. The minimum tari¤ is naturally zero percent, and the upper
bound was set as 50 percent. An NTB penalty is then subtracted from the base score. The penalty
of 5, 10, 15, or 20 points is assigned according to the following scale:
 20 NTBs are used extensively across many goods and services and/or act to e¤ectively
impede a signicant amount of international trade;
 15 NTBs are widespread across many goods and services and/or act to impede a majority
of potential international trade;
 10 NTBs are used to protect certain goods and services and impede some international trade;
 5 NTBs are uncommon, protecting few goods and services, and/or have very limited impact
on international trade;
 0 NTBs are not used to limit international trade;
The extent of NTBs in a countrys trade policy regime is determined using both qualitative and
quantitative information. Restrictive rules that hinder trade vary widely, and their overlapping and
shifting nature makes their complexity di¢ cult to gauge. The categories of NTBs considered in our
penalty include:
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 Quantity restrictions import quotas; export limitations; voluntary export restraints; import
export embargoes and bans; countertrade, etc.
 Price restrictions antidumping duties; countervailing duties; border tax adjustments; vari-
able levies/tari¤ rate quotas.
 Regulatory restrictions licensing; domestic content and mixing requirements; sanitary and
phytosanitary standards (SPSs); safety and industrial standards regulations; packaging, la-
beling, and trademark regulations; advertising and media regulations.
 Investment restrictions exchange and other nancial controls.
 Customs restrictions advance deposit requirements; customs valuation procedures; customs
classication procedures; customs clearance procedures.
 Direct government intervention subsidies and other aid; government industrial policy and
regional development measures; government-nanced research and other technology policies;
national taxes and social insurance; competition policies; immigration policies; government
procurement policies; state trading, government monopolies, and exclusive franchises.
In the paper we used the average values of ITF for the period 1997-2001.
Stability (STABS). Source: Database of Political Institutions (DPI). This counts the percent
of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. Veto players are dened as follows:
for presidential systems, the veto players are the president, the largest party in the legislature, and
the largest party in the Senate; for parliamentary systems, veto players are dened as the prime
minister and the three biggest coalition members. In the paper we used the values of stabs for 2000.
Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (IEC). Source: Database of Political
Institutions (DPI). For executives who are:
 elected directly by population, or
 elected by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing
the executive,
the same scale as Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness (source: DPI ) is used:
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 No executives = 1
 Unelected executive = 2
 Elected, 1 candidate = 3
 1 party, multiple candidates = 4
 Multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats = 5
 Multiple parties won seats but the largest party received more than 75% of the seats = 6
 Largest party got less than 75% = 7
In the paper we used the values of IEC for 2000.
Number of procedures required to enforce a contract (log PROC). Source: World
Bank (WB), Doing Business Database. We used the only available data for the period 2004-2005.
Level of education (EDU). Source: Unesco. The school life expectancy (primary to tertiary
education) is dened as the total number of years of schooling which a child can expect to receive,
assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is
equal to the current enrolment ratio at that age. It is a synthetic summary indicator of the overall
pattern of enrolment ratios at one particular point in time, and has no predictive value except in
so far as it is believed that enrolment patterns will remain unchanged into the future.
In the paper we used the values of education for 2000.
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7 Appendix III- Graphical Analysis
Figure 7- Changes in electricity consumption raw versus ltered series
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Figure 8- MTE versus ECM estimates (% o¢ cial GDP)
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Figure 9- MTE, MIMIC and Chong and Gradsteins estimates (% o¢ cial GDP)
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8 Appendix IV- Interpreting dynamics of the shadow economy:
some anedoctical evidence
Growth-enhancing reforms in developing countries
In Botswana the decrease in the share of unobserved economy during the 1980s may be re-
lated to the phase of impressive economic growth started after independence from Britain in 1966.
Botswanas economic performance has been built on a foundation of diamond mining, prudent scal
policies, international nancial and technical assistance, and a cautious foreign policy. In particular,
it has been noted that good economic policies were chosen in Botswana because good institutions
were in place (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). Analogously, the Egyptian unrecorded
income strongly decreased during the 1980s. Also this reduction may be related to a phase of
particularly high economic growth, following the implementation of a policy regime (Open Door
Policy) which allowed for a greater role of the private sector and for partial liberalization of the
trade sector and of the exchange rate regime. (Dobronogov and Iqbal, 2005). In Malaysia, the
decade 1985-1995 was characterized by a signicant reduction of the unobserved economy and, at
the same time, by a rapid economic growth. The Malaysian economic performance was strongly in-
uenced by a series of policies directed to revive economic growth through investment. The reforms
from the mid-1980s also involved a process of economic stabilization, privatization, restructuring of
state-owned enterprises and, in the area of labor market, the creation of new jobs was emphasized.
In particular, these policies focused on trade and nancial liberalization, market opening, promo-
tion of small and medium enterprises, antitrust legislation, greater opening to foreign investment,
and structural changes toward the development of more technology based industries (Smith, 2000;
Harvie-Pahlavani, 2006).
Transition countries
The unobserved economic activity has surged immediately after the collapse of communism in
1989. The unrecorded income has then begun to decrease mainly thanks to market-oriented reforms,
based on privatization and price- and trade-liberalization measures, that were undertaken during
the 1990s (Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1999). In particular, in Poland, the reduction in the relative
size of unobserved economy may be related to the reforms that removed price controls, eliminated
most industrysubsidies, opened markets to international competition. Similarly, in Hungary the
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reduction in the relative size of unobserved sector may be associated to the positive e¤ects of price
and trade liberalization, tax- and banking-system reforms, introduced by the government in 1990.
In Romania, the recovery was stimulated by government policies based on privatization and trade
liberalization. Moreover, Romania signed an association agreement with the EU in 1992 and a free
trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1993, codifying its access
to European markets and creating the basic framework for further economic integration. In the
Czech and Slovak Republics the decrease in the relative size of unobserved sector may be explained
by the economic reform process- based on privatization, price liberalization and trade openness-
that begun immediately after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Finally, in Bulgaria, reforms were
introduced in 1997.
OECD economies
Finally, among the highly industrialized OECD countries, the unrecorded income has rapidly
decreased in Ireland in the second half of the 1980s. This reduction may be related to a series of
national economic programmes (Tallaght Strategy)- started by the government in 1987- designed to
contain ination, ease tax burdens, reduce government spending, increase labour force skills, and
reward foreign investment. This strategy transformed the Irish economy, that began the so called
Celtic Tiger phase, characterized by an unprecedented economic growth (Powell, 2003). Also in
Spain, the unobserved income started to decrease in the second half of 1980s. This reduction may
be attributed to social and economic policies- introduced in 1985- directed to reduce labor market
rigidities and increase employment. Other two labor market reforms were introduced in 1994 and
1997, respectively. These reforms are considered the main causes of the signicant increase in the
Spanish employment level during the last two decades (Ferreiro and Serrano, 2001; Gil Martin,
2002).
68
Institutions, policies and economic development. What are the
causes of the shadow economy?
Luisanna Onnisy
University of Milan Bicocca-DEFAP
May 2010
Abstract
We investigate the distinct roles played by institutions, growth and policies in determin-
ing the shadow economy. The sharp distinction between theoretical priors on the institutional
determinants of the shadow economy and the technique used for its measurement is the rst
novel contribution of the paper. The second innovation is that, by exploiting the time series
dimension of our panel, we are able to better investigate the link between o¢ cial output growth
and the relative size of shadow economy. The third innovation is that we can contribute to a
long-standing controversy about the distinct roles of "institutions" and "policies" in determining
economic outcomes.
1 Introduction
The unobserved or shadow economy has attracted considerable attention by economists and pol-
icymakers. This is hardly surprising. On the one hand, the unobserved component of national
economies accounts for a large share of GDP in developing countries (La Porta and Shleifer, 2008)
and plays an important role at least in some developed economies like Belgium, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain (DellAnno, 2003; Alañón-Pardo and Gómez-Antonio, 2005; DellAnno, Gómez-
Antonio and Alañón-Pardo, 2007). On the other hand, the existence of a relatively large informal
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sector may have important economic consequences. For instance, the productive potential of unof-
cial rms is typically constrained by limited access to public goods (De Soto, 1989, 2000), but tax
evasion also limits governments ability to supply such public goods and may give to uno¢ cial rms
a substantial cost advantage (Farrell, 2004; Farrell, Baily and Remes, 2005).
It is possible to identify three di¤erent approaches to interpret this phenomenon. The rst
one sees the unobserved economy as the citizensresponse to tax and regulatory pressure by the
government. For instance, Choi and Thum (2005) see the entrepreneursoption to ee to the under-
ground economy as a discipline device that limits corrupt o¢ cialsability to introduce distortions
into the economy. Other contributions emphasize the role of institutional quality, i.e. of institu-
tional constraints on discretion of bureaucrats and policymakers, in shaping incentives to enter the
o¢ cial sector of the economy (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Torgler
and Schneider, 2007). Thus, institutional quality should limit the size of the shadow economy.
The second approach emphasizes the inherent ine¢ ciency of uno¢ cial rms (Amaral and Quintin,
2006; De Paula and Scheinkman, 2008) and looks at the formal and informal sectors as two parallel
economies, where the ine¢ cient informal sector is bound to recede when growth-enhancing policies
raise the skills of the labour force and the quality of the public goods accessible to o¢ cial rms. In
this framework, cross country di¤erentials in the relative size of the shadow economy are strictly
related to di¤erent stages of economic development. In a similar vein, La Porta and Shleifer (2008)
show that the relation between measures of institutional quality and cross country-di¤erentials in
the size of the shadow economy disappears if one controls for percapita income levels. A third
approach sees macroeconomic policies - i.e. the level of public expenditure, ination and taxes -
and the relative dimension of the shadow economy as jointly endogenous outcomes. For instance, in
Koreshkova (2006), a benevolent Ramsey planner chooses the optimal ination tax on the informal
sector, whose size - in turn - is determined by the private sector incentives to escape income taxes
(similar results are obtained in Nicolini, 1998, and Cavalcanti and Villamil, 2003).
This paper investigates the distinct roles played by institutions, growth and policies in deter-
mining the shadow economy. To this aim, we must rst identify reliable measures of the shadow
economy. In contrast with previous contributions 1, we do not rely on estimates based on the
1Loayza (1996), Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2003), Giles, Tedds and
Werkneh (2002), Tedds and Giles (2002), DellAnno (2003), Bajada and Schneider (2005), Schneider (2004, 2005,
2008), Alañón and Gómez-Antonio (2005), Buehn, Karmann and Schneider (2007), DellAnno, Gómez-Antonio and
2
MIMIC latent variable method. This method typically represents the shadow economy in terms of
"causal variables" (taxation, regulatory burden, attitudes toward the state) and "likely indicators"
(changes in the demand for currency, in the labour force participation rate and in o¢ cial GDP).
2 Since variables that identify institutional quality are typically related to the standard "causal
variables" behind MIMIC estimates, interpreting MIMIC estimates on the grounds of institutional
factors would be tautological. For our purposes, we must rely on shadow-economy estimates which
are independent from the theoretical priors that drive our subsequent analysis. For this reason, we
rely on data supplied by Onnis and Tirelli (2010), who apply a version of the Modied Total Elec-
tricity approach (Eilat and Zinnes, 2002) to a panel of 49 countries over the period 1981-2005.3 This
method obtains shadow-economy estimates from electricity consumption data which are ltered to
remove the inuence of additional factors such as variations in electricity prices and in the relative
weight of energy-intensive industrial sectors.
The sharp distinction between theoretical priors on the institutional determinants of the shadow
economy and the technique used for its measurement is the rst novel contribution of the paper. The
second innovation is that, by exploiting the time series dimension of our panel, we are able to better
investigate the link between o¢ cial output growth and the relative size of shadow economy. Our
empirical approach is based on the System GMM method, designed for regressions characterized
by "small T, large N" panels, regressors that are not strictly exogenous, xed e¤ects, within-
country heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998). The third innovation is that we contribute to a long-standing controversy
about the distinct roles of "institutions" and "policies" in determining economic outcomes. In this
regard, Acemoglu, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) support the view that macroeconomic policies
play a minor role once the role of institutional variables is accounted for. By contrast, Glaeser, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) support the view that "good policies" should not be
seen as a mechanical consequence of a countrys institutional setting.
In a nutshell, our results suggest that all the potential interpretations of the shadow economy
contain a grain of truth. We do nd that growth in the o¢ cial economy has a negative e¤ect on
Alañón-Pardo (2007), Brambila-Macias (2008).
2The choice of "causal variables" and "likely e¤ects" appears arbitrary (Helberger and Knepel, 1988; Smith, 2002;
Hill, 2002; Breusch, 2005).
3Given the availability of data on institutional quality, in the following analysis we exclude Hong Kong and use
shorter time series (1984-2005).
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the size of the shadow economy. But we also nd a negative and signicant impact for indicators of
institutional quality, even after controlling for per capita GDP. In addition, we show that corruption
has a negative impact on the shadow economy. In contrast with La Porta and Shleifer (2008), these
results suggest that the shadow economy should not be dismissed as the unpleasant side e¤ect
of economic underdevelopment. Instead it is related to some specic institutional aspects that
may well survive even when the economy reaches higher development stages. This may explain
why highly industrialized OECD economies, such as Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain,
are characterized by a relatively high share of unrecorded income. Turning to the analysis of
macroeconomic policies, we cannot detect any signicant e¤ect of ination on the shadow economy.
By contrast, we nd that - after controlling for institutional quality and for the level of development -
public expenditures still have a negative impact on the shadow economy. We take this as an indirect
support of the view that the supply of public goods has a specic positive e¤ect on the choice of
"going formal". Finally, we explore the role of corruption on the size of unobserved economy, nding
that this e¤ect is always negative and statistically signicant, conrming the argument put forward
by Choi and Thum (2005): following an increase in corruption, more entrepreneurs will ee to
underground activities, but a composition e¤ect - uno¢ cial rms are undersized relative to o¢ cial
ones - will induce a fall in the share of the unobserved economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
denes the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Our analysis is inspired by La Porta and Shleifer (2008), who group the determinants of the uno¢ cial
economy into three broad categories: the cost of becoming formal, the cost of staying formal and the
benets of being formal. Given the limited length of available time series data for their denition
of entry costs (World Bank, 2010), we cannot examine the inuence of the costs of becoming
formal on the relative size of unobserved economy. The costs of staying formal include government
regulations. Of all these types of regulations4, those related to workerswelfare are considered
the most restrictive and costly in underdeveloped and some developed countries (Loayza, 1996).
4Common types of regulations are those related to environmental protection, allocation of imported inputs, con-
sumer protection and quality control, nancial capital availability, and workerswelfare.
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As described in Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), regulation of
labor markets aiming to protect workers from employers may take four forms. First, governments
forbid discrimination in the labor market and endow the workers with some basic rights (maternity
leaves, minimum wage, etc.). Second, governments regulate employment relationships, by raising,
for example, the costs of both laying o¤ workers and increasing hours of work. Third, governments
empower labor unions to represent workers collectively, and protect particular union strategies
in negotiations with employers. Fourth, governments themselves provide social insurance against
unemployment, old age, disability, sickness and health, or death. A strong protection of workers
rights is, therefore, a cost for the entrepreneurs to remain in the formal sector.5
The benets of being formal are basically related to expanded access to public goods, including
direct or indirect participation to international goods markets. Trade is transparent and easier to
tax and therefore more di¢ cult to hide in the unobserved economy. Thus, in an open economy
only those rms that operate in the o¢ cial sector fully exploit the advantages from international
trade. Moreover, openness is expected to increase the size of registered rms and, given their
obstacles to trade, impede the growth of uno¢ cial ones. Registered business may also nd it easier
to use courts to enforce property rights and adjudicate disputes. By contrast, since unobserved
activities are illegal, informal entrepreneurs cannot exercise full property rights over their capital
and product. Therefore, contracts related to informal activities cannot be enforced through the
judicial system and, thus, their value and usefulness are greatly diminished. The inability to sign
enforceable contracts creates uncertainty and increases the transaction and monitoring costs in all
business dealings conducted in the unobserved sector (De Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1996).
In addition, both ination and income taxes play an important role. As discussed in the intro-
duction, ination is a tax that mostly a¤ects the informal sector (Koreshkova, 2006).6 Income taxes
generate double-edged incentives. A voluminous literature sees tax burden as the key motive for
choosing informality. Dessy and Pallage (2001) challenge this view. They point out that formaliz-
ing production does not just mean taking an old technology and making it legal. This implies that
5Nipon (1991) estimated that informal rms in Thailand, by ignoring labour-protection laws, saved about 13 to
22 percent of labour wages. Tokman (1992) reported that labour regulations increased costs for small rms in Latin
America by an average of around 20 percent.
6An opposite view (Giles, 1999; Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Vuletin, 2008) holds that, since ination tends to be
unequal across sectors, it alters income distribution, and this may induce disrespect for tax law. Therefore, the higher
the ination, the larger the size of unobserved sector.
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switching from low to high-productivity technologies allows to take advantage of the availability of
public infrastructures. Formalization therefore generates a productivity premium which increases
with infrastructure quality. Such a premium is an additional opportunity cost of informality. As a
consequence, relatively high tax rates may actually increase the costs of being informal, and vice
versa.
Finally, we consider the role of corruption. The e¤ect of corruption on the relative size of
uno¢ cial economy is ambiguous. Hindriks, Muthoo and Keen (1999) see the shadow economy and
corruption as complements. This is because in their model the tax payer colludes with tax inspector,
convincing the latter to underreport the tax liability of the former in exchange for a bribe. The
opposite result obtains in a model by Choi and Thum (2005), where entrepreneurs of uno¢ cial rms
risk detection, whereas o¢ cial rms are subject to bribery payments. If the probability of detection
increases with uno¢ cial rms size (capital stock) and the loss of prots due to bribery payments
falls with o¢ cial rms size, then the structure of the economy is dualistic, with uno¢ cial rms
being undersized relative to the o¢ cial ones. In this framework, an increase in the o¢ cials ability
to monitor underground activities may well lead to a fall in the relative size of the shadow economy,
because more entrepreneurs will go underground but the relative size of uno¢ cial rms will fall.
Empirically, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) nd
a positive relationship between corruption and shadow economy, i.e. corruption and unobserved
economy are complements. On the contrary, Dreher, Kotsogiannis and McCorriston (2009) support
the hypotheses that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes.
We relate such costs and benets to the three approaches outlined in the introduction. Our
modelling strategy therefore accounts for the stage of development (per-capita o¢ cial income), for
the role of institutional quality and for the inuence of macroeconomic policy outcomes. Thus we
test the following model:
SH i;t= 0+
hX
j=1
jIQj;i;t+h+1XN i;t+h+2yi;t+h+3Gi;t+h+4i;t+"i;t (1)
where i indexes the countries in the sample and t the time period. SH denotes the size of
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the shadow economy as a percentage of the o¢ cial GDP7, IQ are h indicators for institutional
quality, XN measures trade openness, y is the per-capita GDP (in logs), G is the share of public
expenditure, and  is the ination rate.8
2.1 Indicators of institutional quality
We explain here the composition of
Ph
j=1 jIQj;i;t. Institutional data from International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) have been often used in the literature (Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Chong
and Gradstein, 2007). These data are available for the period 1984   2005. The ICRG risk rating
system assigns a numerical value to a predetermined range of risk components for a large number
of countries. We adopt the institutional variables most commonly used in the literature:, rule
of law, democratic accountability, government stability, bureaucracy quality and corruption. The
variable rule of law is the sum of two components. The law component assesses the strength
of impartiality of the legal system, and the order component assesses popular observance of the
law. This index ranges between 0 and 6 with increasing quality. We take it as a measure of
the benets of formalization. The variable democratic accountability ranges between 0 and 6 with
increasing quality. It measures how responsive government is to the electorate. The intuition is that
accountability reduces policymakersrent seeking activities, thus lowering the costs of being formal.
The variable government stability ranges between 0 and 12 with increasing quality. It measures
the governments ability to stay in o¢ ce and carry out its declared program. The rating is the
sum of three subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength and popular support. We posit
that government stability is an inverse proxy for political uncertainty, where the latter lowers the
benets from staying in the formal economy. The variable bureaucracy quality ranges between 0
and 4. High scores are given to countries where bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous
from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. The
interpretation of this variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, it should signal stability in the
mechanisms driving the functioning of the publish sector, as it is relatively independent from political
7See the Appendix for a discussion of measurement techniques for the shadow economy.
8XN is the standard Exports + Imports to GDP ratio (source: United Nations). Data on y are taken from United
Nations, constant (1990) prices, US Dollars. Data on the share of total government spending, as a percent of GDP
are taken from Penn World Table. Ination is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deator
(source: World Bank). The GDP implicit deator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant
local currency.
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pressures. On the other hand, relative independence from political pressures might correspond to
insu¢ cient accountability, leaving room for excessive power of the bureaucratic structure. Finally,
the variable corruption measures corruption within the political system. It ranges between 0 and
6 (very high level of corruption). As discussed, its relationship with the shadow economy is a
priori ambiguous. Alternatively, the corruption perception index (cpi) published by Transparency
International measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public o¢ cials
and politicians. The cpi is based on 13 di¤erent expert and business surveys and ranges between 1
and 10 (very high corruption).
As an alternative measure of institutional quality we adopt an index of economic freedom (Her-
itage Foundation). This variable (unfortunately available only for the 1995   2005 subsample) is
the simple average of 7 subcomponents- business freedom, scal freedom, trade freedom, monetary
freedom, nancial freedom, investment freedom and property rights- and comprises 0 to 10 points.
Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate and close a business that
represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the e¢ ciency of government in the regulatory
process. Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed by governments.9 Trade freedom
is a measure of the absence of tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers that a¤ect imports and exports of good
and services. Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price
controls10. Financial freedom is a measure of banking security as well as a measure of independence
from government control. In fact, state ownership of banks and other nancial institutions gener-
ally lowers the level of available services. Investment freedom measures the availability to move the
resources into and out of specic activities both internally and across the countrys borders without
restriction. Finally, the property rights component is an assessment of the availability of individuals
to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. The
variables of the data sets ICRG and the index of economic freedom are highly correlated.
Finally, as a proxy for the regulation of labor, we use an indicator of the protection of workers
rights that ranges between 0 and 2. 11
9Fiscal freedom includes both the direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate
incomes and the overall amount of tax revenues as a percentage of GDP.
10Both ination and price controls distort market activity. Price stability without microeconomic intervention is
the ideal state for the free market.
11Workers rights may be: (0) severely restricted, (1) somewhat restricted, (2) fully protected (source: Human
Rights Dataset).
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2.2 Previous empirical evidence on the role of institutions
Several studies empirically analyze the role of institutional quality on the uno¢ cial economy. John-
son et al.s (1998) investigation of 49 countries in Latin America, the OECD, and the former Soviet
Union block nds a statistically signicant positive relationship between di¤erent measures of cor-
ruption and the shadow economy. Similarly, Friedman et al. (2000) test the relationship between
unregistered income, bureaucracy, corruption and the legal environment in 69 countries. In a panel-
data analysis, Loayza and Rigolini (2006) investigate the role of institutional indicators on the size
of unobserved economy, proxied by the percentage of the active labor force that is self employed.
They nd that, in a sample of 42 countries, informal employment is more prevalent when business
exibility and the rule of law are weaker. Similarly, Torgler and Schneider (2007) nd a negative
and statistically signicant relationship between several measures of the quality of institutions and
their MIMIC estimates of the unobserved economy over the periods 1990, 1995 and 2000, in 86, 88
and 100 countries, respectively. In a cross-section analysis, also Chong and Gradstein (2007) nd
the evidence of a negative relationship between shadow economy and the quality of institutions in
around 100 countries during the 1990s. They adopt two groups of estimates of unobserved econ-
omy i) macro-electric estimates calculated by assuming that elasticity of electricity consumption to
gross domestic product decreases in 0.05 from decade to decade; ii) MIMIC estimates obtained by
Schneider and Klingmair (2003) and Schneider (2005). Chong and Gradstein (2007) do not obtain
the same result in a panel data analysis. In this case, the relationship between shadow economy and
the quality of institutions is still negative but no longer signicant. Finally, by using micro-data
on the level of informality 12, also Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) nd that more
developed and e¢ cient legal institutions reduce the incidence of informality.
3 Methodology
We employ the System GMM technique (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blun-
dell and Bond, 1998) that is considered particularly appropriate for our panel data. This estimator
has been, in fact, designed for situations with "small T, large N" panels, independent variables
12Micro data on the level of informality derive from World Business Environment Survey and refer to 4000 rms in
41 countries.
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that are not strictly exogenous13, xed e¤ects, and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
countries. By using this method, we estimate a regression equation transformed by using forward
orthogonal deviations and a regression equation in levels simultaneously, with each equation using
its own specic set of instrumental variables. In the transformed equation, variables that are not
strictly exogenous are instrumented with their lags in levels, while in the equation in levels, variables
are instrumented with their own rst di¤erences. 14 The use of orthogonal deviations is due to the
presence of gaps in our panel data. Proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), the orthogonal devia-
tions transformation, rather than subtracting the previous observation, subtracts the average of all
available future observations.15 Therefore, orthogonal deviations have the advantage of preserving
the panel size.
The consistency of the System GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the ex-
planatory variables are valid instruments in the regression. We address this issue by considering
three specication tests: the Arellano-Bond test, the Hansen J test and the di¤erence-in-Hansen
test. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is
applied to the di¤erenced residuals. The rst-order serial correlation test usually rejects the null
hypothesis. Second-order serial correlation of the di¤erenced residuals indicates that the original
error terms are serially correlated and follow a moving average process at least of order one. If
the AR(2) test fails to reject the null, the original error terms are, therefore, serially uncorrelated.
The Arellano-Bond test is run on di¤erenced residuals even after estimation in deviations. The
Hansen J test (robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorellation) tests the overall validity of the
instruments, i.e. it tests of whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. Failure to
reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. Finally, the di¤erence-in-Hansen methodol-
ogy tests the exogeneity of each subgroup of instruments. We split each instrument subgroup in
two for di¤erence-in-Hansen purposes, one each for the transformed and level equations. This is
especially useful for testing the instruments for the levels equation based on lagged di¤erences of
the dependent variable, which are the most suspect in System GMM.
As reported in the literature on GMMmethodology, a large collection of instruments, even if valid
13Non strictly exogenous variables are correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the errors.
14 In our analysis, we consider all the explanatory variables non strictly exogenous variables.
15 If the original observation-specic errors are i.i.d., then so are the transformed ones (Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Roodman, 2006). Moreover, like di¤erencing, taking orthogonal deviations removes xed e¤ects.
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in specication tests, can be collectively invalid in nite samples because they overt endogenous
variables. Tauchen (1986) demonstrates in simulations of very small samples (50-75 observations)
that the bias of GMM rises as more instruments, based on deeper lags of variables, are introduced.
Similar results are obtained in Ziliak (1997). In Monte Carlo tests of Di¤erence GMM, Windmeijer
(2005) reports that, on 8 100 panels, reducing the instruments from 28 to 13 reduces the average
bias in the two-step estimate of the parameter of interest by 40%. Following Roodman (2008), we
combine two approaches to instrument containment. The rst one is to use only certain lags instead
of all available lags for instruments.16 The second one is to adopt the "collapse" suboption which
creates one instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period,
variable, and lag distance17.
4 Results
In tables 1-4, we report the results of 16 System GMM regressions. We also report the results of the
Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests. As can be readily seen, we always fail to reject the null hypotheses
of no (second-order) autocorrelation and exogeneity of the entire group of instruments. The results
of the single di¤erence-in-Hansen tests are not reported in the tables. For both the transformed
and the level equation, we always fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for each subgroup
of instruments.
Given the relatively large number of regressors, to facilitate discussion we present our estimates
in stages (Table 1). The rst striking result is that, even if we observe a negative and statistically
signicant e¤ect of o¢ cial per-capita GDP, measures of institutional quality retain a signicant
impact on SH. Variables rule of law, democratic accountability, government stability, and trade
openness have the expected negative e¤ects. Bureaucracy quality presents a positive sign, suggesting
that, even though independent bureaucracies may be interpreted as a sign of low political risk, their
independent role lowers incentives to formalization. As expected, we nd evidence of a positive
and statistically signicant relationship between protection of workersrights and our estimates of
unregistered income. Turning to the analysis of macrroeconomic policies, we nd a negative and
16For each variable, the choice of the lags as instruments has been based on the results of the specic di¤erence-in-
Hansen tests.
17 In the paper we present the results obtained adopting the "collapse" option. However, we have obtained the same
results without using this option.
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signicant relationship between the unobserved economy and the share of government spending. By
contrast, we cannot nd evidence of a signicant e¤ect of ination on the unobserved economy.
To test the robustness of these results, we rstly reduce the cross-sectional dimension of the
panel. We re-estimate the regression equation (1), excluding from the panel Germany and the six
transition economies. We exclude these countries because of the lower quality of their institutional
data before the 1990s. As reported in Table 2 (regression 1), our results survive, with the exception
of trade openness. Second, to conrm that our results are not distorted by correlations among the
single ICRG institutional indicators18, we re-estimate equation (1) for the entire panel of countries
by using an aggregate indicator of these institutional variables. This aggregate variable has been
obtained as the simple average of the four (rescaled) ICRG institutional indicators. The relationship
between this aggregate measure and the size of unobserved sector is still negative and statistically
signicant (Table 2, regression 2). In addition, we substitute the four ICRG institutional variables
with the rst component of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).19 Again, we nd a negative and
statistically signicant relationship between the transformed variable and the share of unobserved
economy (Table 2, regression 3). Finally, in alternative to the ICRG institutional variables, we
adopt the index of economic freedom. Since ination and trade openness are used to construct
two subcomponents of this variable- i.e. trade freedom and monetary freedom, respectively- we
exclude these two variables from the regression equation. As reported in Table 2 (regression 4)
the relationship between unobserved income and the index of economic freedom is negative and
statistically signicant.
Finally, we explore the impact of corruption on the size of unobserved economy (Table 3).
Adopting the two alternative measures of corruption, we nd that the relationship between unob-
served economy and the corruption is always negative and statistically signicant, suggesting that
the composition e¤ect outlined in Choi and Thum (2005) is dominant. The relationships between
unobserved economy and per capita GDP, institutional quality, and public expenditure remain
18Testing the correlation between the ICRG institutional variables, we obtain positive and statistically signicant
coe¢ cients included between 0.3 and 0.6. Hence, we exclude problems of multicollinearity which arise when the
correlation coe¢ cients are close to 0.9.
19The Principal component analysis (PCA) involves a mathematical procedure that transforms a number of possibly
correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called principal components. The rst principal
component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding component accounts
for as much of the remaining variability as possible.
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statistically signicant. 20
5 Conclusions
Theoretical models suggest that the shadow economy is a constraint on economic e¢ ciency. Our
results show that triggering faster growth of the o¢ cial economy is not a panacea for this, even
though it has unambiguously benecial e¤ects. In fact, institutional design and even the choice of
government size may determine additional cross-country di¤erences in the relative size of the shadow
economy. Thus, both institutional design and public expenditure policies should specically target
private sectors incentives to enter the o¢ cial economy. This is a promising eld of future research.
20For all the regressions of Table 3, we fail to reject the hypotheses of no autocorrelation and exogeneity of the
entire group (and individual sub groups) of instruments.
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6 Tables
Table 1- System GMM estimation
Shadow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Law and order  0:02    0:02    0:02    0:02  
Bureaucratic quality 0:02 0:04   0:05  
Democratic accountability  0:04    0:03  
Government stability  0:01
Log gdp per capita  0:07    0:09    0:09    0:08  
Openness to trade  0:09    0:07    0:08    0:07
Protection workers rights
Public expenditure
Ination
Observations 1030 1030 1026 1026
Second-order correlation p = 0:88 p = 0:96 p = 0:5 p = 0:7
Hansen Test p = 0:17 p = 0:19 p = 0:7 p = 0:4
Regressions with constant terms and robust standard errors (not reported).
* Statistically signicant at 10%. ** Statistically signicant at 5%. *** Statistically signicant at 1%.
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Table 1 (continued)
Shadow (5) (6) (7)
Law and order  0:02    0:04    0:04  
Bureaucratic quality 0:04   0:08   0:08  
Democratic accountability  0:04    0:04    0:04  
Government stability  0:01    0:01    0:01  
Log gdp per capita  0:09    0:09    0:09  
Openness to trade  0:03  0:08  0:09
Protection workers rights 0:01   0:02   0:02  
Public expenditure  1  1:1  
Ination  0:01
Observations 978 959 947
Second-order correlation p = 0:6 p = 0:5 p = 0:2
Hansen Test p = 0:5 p = 0:3 p = 0:5
Regressions with constant terms and robust standard errors (not reported).
* Statistically signicant at 10%. ** Statistically signicant at 5%. *** Statistically signicant at 1%.
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Table 2-System GMM estimation
Shadow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Law and order  0:04  
Bureaucratic quality 0:05  
Democratic accountability  0:04  
Government stability  0:02  
Institutional quality  0:03  
Institutional quality (PCA)  0:04  
Index of economic freedom  0:06  
Log gdp per capita  0:09    0:05    0:05    0:07  
Openness to trade 0:03  0:02  0:09
Protection of workersrights 0:02   0:02   0:01 0:02
Public expenditure  0:97    1:17    0:91  0:75
Ination  0:01 0:00  0:01
Observations 839 947 947 462
Second-order correlation p = 0:2 p = 0:9 p = 0:8 p = 0:3
Hansen test p = 0:5 p = 0:4 p = 0:4 p = 0:1
Regressions with constant terms and robust standard errors (not reported).
* Statistically signicant at 10%. ** Statistically signicant at 5%. *** Statistically signicant at 1%.
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Table 3-System GMM estimation
Shadow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Law and order  0:02    0:02    0:04    0:04    0:02  
Bureaucratic quality 0:03   0:03 0:05 0:05   0:05  
Democratic accountability  0:03    0:03    0:02    0:02    0:02  
Government stability  0:01    0:01    0:01    0:01    0:01  
Corruption  0:02    0:02    0:02    0:02  
CPI  0:04  
Log gdp per capita  0:08    0:07    0:08    0:08    0:16  
Openness to trade  0:01 0:01  0:04  0:04  0:04
Protection workers rights 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01  
Public expenditure  0:8    0:8    0:9  
Ination 0:00 0:01
Observations 1026 978 959 947 639
Second-order correlation p = 0:8 p = 0:7 p = 0:9 p = 0:8 p = 0:2
Hansen test p = 0:6 p = 0:2 p = 0:4 p = 0:6 p = 0:4
Regressions with constant terms and robust standard errors (not reported).
* Statistically signicant at 10%. ** Statistically signicant at 5%. *** Statistically signicant at 1%.
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7 Appendix
Di¤erent techniques may be used to estimate the size of the unrecorded economy. The OECD (2002)
identies three main macro-model methods: i) the Currency Demand Approach (CDA henceforth)21
assumes that unobserved transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave
no observable traces for the tax authorities. In this framework, non-measured production can be
modelled in terms of stocks or ows of money; ii) the latent variable methods (MIMIC)22 model
the unobserved economic activity in terms of two sets of variables. The rst one is assumed to
determine the size and growth of non-measured production ("causal variables"). The second one
is exploited to provide evidence of the missing activities ("likely indicators"); iii) the Electricity
Consumption method23 is based on the empirical observation that overall economic activity and
electricity consumption move in lockstep. Measures of total (observed and unobserved) GDP growth
are therefore obtained by imposing a constant electricity consumption-to-GDP ratio.
All these methods have shortcomings. The CDA is based on the estimate of a currency demand
equation where, in addition to conventional controls (income growth, payment habits, etc.), some
other variables are included on the basis of theoretical priors about their impact on unobserved
transactions. These typically include the direct and indirect tax burden, government regulation,
and the social security burden. Critics of this approach point out that: i) not all the transactions
in the unobserved economy are paid in cash (Isachsen and Strom, 1985) ii) if the ratio of currency
to current deposits is used as a dependent variable, observed increases in currency demand may due
largely to a slowdown in demand deposits rather than to an increase in currency demand caused
by activities in the unobserved economy (Feige, 1996) iii) CDA estimates of unobserved economy
are not signicantly robust to changes in the explanatory variables (Hill and Kabir, 1996; Breusch,
2005) iv) the assumption that the velocity of money is the same for o¢ cial and shadow economy
is open to criticism (Ahumada, Alvaredo and Canavese, 2007) v) the assumption of no unobserved
economy in a base year is implausible (Thomas, 1999). The theoretical priors behind the MIMIC
model are similar to those who are used to identify the unrecorded economy in the CDA. As "likely
causes" of the unobserved economy the MIMIC procedure generally uses the burden of taxation,
21See Cagan (1958), Gutmann (1977) and Tanzi (1980, 1983).
22The pioneers of this approach are Frey and Weck (1983, 1984).
23See Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997).
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burden of regulation and citizensattitudes toward the state (tax morale). As "likely indicators" it
uses changes in the labour force participation rate, in o¢ cial GDP and in the demand for currency.
Critics24 of the MIMIC approach mainly point at the arbitrariness of the variables grouping into
causes and indicators. Moreover, the use of variables like taxes and government regulation as likely
determinants of the unrecorded economic strongly limits the possibility to explain the MIMIC (and
CDA) estimates on the grounds of economic and institutional factors.
Contrary to the CDA and MIMIC methods, the Electricity Consumption approach does not
require theoretical priors on the determinants of the unregistered economy. Critics see the assump-
tion of a constant electricity consumption to GDP ratio as a major weakness of the approach. To
allow for both country heterogeneity and a time-varying electricity consumption to GDP ratio, sev-
eral authors25 have imposed ad hoc values for this key parameter. A more innovative and direct
measurement procedure has been presented by Eilat and Zinnes (2002)26. Their Modied Total
Electricity (MTE) approach lters the inuence of additional factors that a¤ect changes in electric
consumption in addition to changes in overall economic activity. These additional variables may
include changes in relative electricity prices and in the industry-to-GDP share. To the extent that
the ltered series of electric usage captures the output-induced changes in electricity consumption,
a unitary output elasticity of electricity may then be used for all countries.
Critics27 see the assumption of a constant electricity consumption to GDP ratio as a major
weakness of the approaches based on the electricity consumption. They emphasize, in particular, the
potential downward bias caused by energy-saving technological change. Nevertheless, according to
the JevonsParadox (Jevons, 1865, 1965), the technological progress that increases energy e¢ ciency,
tends to increase (rather than decrease) the rate of energy consumption. In fact, in addition to
reducing the amount of energy needed for a given use, improved e¢ ciency lowers the relative cost of
energy consumption, which increases demand and economic growth, further expanding energy use.
In this paper we adopt the estimates of unrecorded income reported in Onnis and Tirelli (2010).
To measure the share of unobserved economy in a large panel of countries, we use the two-stage
MTE procedure proposed by Eilat and Zinnes (2002) . First, the series of electricity consumption
24Helberger and Knepel (1988), Smith (2002), Hill (2002), and Breusch (2005).
25Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Johnson et al. (1997) and Chong and Gradstein (2007).
26Eilat and Zinnes (2002) used the MTE methodology to measure the unobserved economies of 25 transition
countries during the period 1995-1997.
27Lacko (1998, 1999) and Hanousek and Palda (2006).
27
growth is ltered to remove the inuence of changes in the weight of the industry sector and in
relative electricity prices. This is based on the assumption that changes in real price of electricity
(in terms of other domestically produced goods) capture the e¤ects of supply shocks and of long
term e¢ ciency gains caused by technical change. Such factors are likely to a¤ect electricity prices
in all market economies. Di¤erently, changes in the industry share of GDP a¤ect that part of
electricity consumption which is directly related to the country-specic evolution in the composition
of domestic output, possibly due to di¤erent stages of economic development. Second, the growth
rate of the unobserved economy is then obtained by subtracting the growth rate of the o¢ cial
economy from the ltered series of electricity consumption growth - where the latter proxies the
growth rate of the overall economy. Finally, estimates of the unobserved-economy-to-o¢ cial-GDP
ratios are obtained by applying the estimated changes of unrecorded income to pre-existing base-year
gures. 28
28We have chosen base-year gures that have been largely used in the academic literature. In particular, we have
adopted the macroelectric estimates of Johnson et al. (1997)- for the transition economies- and Lacko (1996, 1998)-
for the OECD and Developing countries.
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Abstract
In the paper we reverse the standard approach typically followed in the literature on the
shadow economy. Instead of exploiting money demand data to extrapolate the dynamics of
the shadow economy, we explore the long run e¤ect of shadow economy measures - obtained
independently from money demand functions - on money velocity. By doing this, the original
contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we improve the understanding of money velocity
determinants. Second, we provide an indirect test of the reliability of the estimates on the
shadow economy presented in Onnis and Tirelli (2010).
1 Introduction
Unobserved transactions are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable
traces for the tax authorities. Therefore, an increase in the size of the uno¢ cial sector will increase
the demand for currency. This is the fundamental assumption of the Currency Demand Approach
(CDA). The CDA is one of the most commonly used approaches, applied to many OECD countries.1
The CDA methodology indirectly measures unrecorded income through the direct estimation of a
currency demand equation, where, in addition to conventional controls, i.e. income growth, payment
habits, etc., are included other variables on the basis of theoretical priors about their impact on
We are grateful to Emilio Colombo, Giorgio Motta, Ra¤aele Rossi and Patrizio Tirelli.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza dellAteneo 1, Milan, Italy. e-mail:
luisanna.onnis@unimib.it.
1See Schneider (1997, 1998), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998) and Williams and Windebank (1995).
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unobserved transactions. Hence, the amount of money unexplained by the conventional controls
are then attributed to variations to those indicators, such as tax burden, government regulation,
and the social security burden, associated with the unobserved economic activity.2 Even though the
basic idea of linking the unobserved economy with the demand of money is quite appealing (Rogo¤,
1999), the CDA as a tool for measurement of the shadow economy has fallen out of fashion due to
a number of serious pittfalls (OECD 2002).
In the paper we reverse the standard approach typically followed in the literature. Instead of
exploiting money demand data to extrapolate the dynamics of the shadow economy, we explore
the long run e¤ect of shadow economy measures - obtained independently from money demand
functions - and money velocity. By doing this, the original contribution of the paper is twofold. On
the one hand we improve the understanding of money velocity determinants. On the other hand
we provide an indirect test of the reliability of the shadow economy measures presented in Onnis
and Tirelli (2010).
To this aim, we must rst identify reliable measures of the shadow economy. In contrast with
previous contributions 3, we do not rely on estimates based on the MIMIC latent variable method.
This method typically represents the shadow economy in terms of "causal variables" (taxation,
regulatory burden, attitudes toward the state) and "likely indicators" (changes in the demand for
currency, in the labour force participation rate and in o¢ cial GDP).4 Given the role played by
currency demand in producing estimates of the shadow economy, basing our analysis on MIMIC
estimates would lead to almost tautological conclusions. For this reason, we rely on data supplied by
Onnis and Tirelli (2010), who apply a version of the Modied Total Electricity approach (Eilat and
Zinnes, 2002) to a panel of 49 countries over the period 1981-2005.5 This method obtains shadow-
economy estimates from electricity consumption data which are ltered to remove the inuence of
2The currency demand approach was rst used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation of the currency
demand and the tax pressure for the United States over the period 1919 to 1955. 20 years later, Gutmann (1977)
used the same approach but without any statistical procedures. Cagans approach was further developed by Tanzi
(1980, 1983), who econometrically estimated a currency demand function for the United States for the period 1929
to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy.
3Loayza (1996), Giles (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2003), Giles, Tedds and
Werkneh (2002), Tedds and Giles (2002), DellAnno (2003), Bajada and Schneider (2005), Schneider (2004, 2005,
2008), Alañón and Gómez-Antonio (2005), Buehn, Karmann and Schneider (2007), DellAnno, Gómez-Antonio and
Alañón-Pardo (2007), Brambila-Macias (2008).
4The choice of "causal variables" and "likely e¤ects" appears arbitrary (Helberger and Knepel, 1988; Smith, 2002;
Hill, 2002; Breusch, 2005).
5Given the availability of data on money demand and interest rates, in the following analysis we exclude Paraguay,
Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.
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additional factors such as variations in the weight of energy-intensive industrial sectors and relative
electricity prices.
For the rst time in this paper, we examine the relationship between the dimension of unobserved
sector and the velocity of circulation of money in a panel data analysis. Using the group-mean
panel Fully Modied Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method proposed by Pedroni (2000, 2001)
we nd a negative and statistically signicant relationship between money velocity and unrecorded
economy. This results is robust to di¤erent specications of the estimated model. This implies
a positive relationship between unobserved transactions and demand for currency. Therefore, by
conrming the plausible assumption that transactions in the unobserved sector are carried out using
cash, we also prove the validity of our MTE estimates of unrecorded economy. A striking result
we obtain in the paper is that income-related changes in money velocity are more signicantly
explained by variations in relative size of the shadow economy, whereas variations in o¢ cial income
play a limited role. This result is even stronger if we restrict our analysis to OECD countries, where
payments systems are more sophisticated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model . Section 3
describes the data and denes the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model identication
According to the standard theory of money demand, money is demanded for two reasons: as a
mean of exchange, and as one among several assets in a portfolio. These two reasons lead to the
following, common long-run specication of money demand:
M
P
= f(Y o; r) (1)
where MP is the real narrow money (M1), Y
o is the real o¢ cial GDP and r is the nominal interest
rate.6
To analyze the relationship between the demand for currency and the unobserved economic
6This is the specication used in several studies (Hamori, 2008; Rao and Kumar, 2008). Additional variables like
the ination rate and/or exchange rate are added in some empirical works (Bahamani-Oskooee and Rehman, 2005;
Ozturk and Acaravci, 2008; Valadkhani, 2008; Narayan, Narayan and Mishra, 2009).
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activity it is possible to extend equation (1):
M
P
= f(Y o; Y u; r) (2)
where Y u is the real unrecorded income. However, to estimate equation (2) may generate serious
problems of collinearity between o¢ cial and uno¢ cial GDP (like in Buehn and Goethel, 2008). As
an alternative indirect approach, we suggest to estimate the relationship between the relative size
of unobserved economy and the velocity of circulation of money.
The overall amount of money can be considered as the sum of money in the o¢ cial and uno¢ cial
sectors, that is MO and MU respectively:
M
P
=
M
P
O
+
M
P
U
(3)
After simple manipulations, we can rewrite equation (3):
M
Y OP
=
M
Y OP
O
+ sh
M
Y UP
U
(4)
where, according to the Equation of Exchange (Fisher, 1911), MY P is the inverse of the velocity of
circulation of money V 7 and sh is the relative size of unobserved economy with respect to o¢ cial
GDP (Y
U
Y O
):
V = V O +
1
sh
V U (5)
We therefore expect a negative relationship between money velocity and unobserved economic
activity. Testing this relationship obviously requires that other controls be included, capturing
economic determinants of money velocity.
7Fishers version of the Quantity Theory of Money is expressed in his Equation of Exchange (Fisher, 1911):
MV = PT
where M is the money stock, V is the velocity of money (that is the average frequency with which a unit of money
is spent in a specic period of time), P is the price level and T is the nominal value of transactions. Using the real
GDP as a proxy for the volume of transactions, Fishers equation may be rewritten in this way:
MV = PY
4
The modern version of the Quantity Theory indicates that the velocity of money depends on
some measure of income and interest rate.8 As discussed above, the presence of unobserved economic
activities may inuence the payment habits. A measure of the relative size of unrecorded economy
should therefore enter the velocity function along with measures of income and interest rate.
We propose the following specication of the velocity function:
lnVi;t = i + 1 ln ri;t + 2 ln yi;t + 3 ln shi;t + "i;t (6)
where lnV is the log of money velocity, ln r the log of nominal interest rate, ln y the log of real
income, and sh the log of unrecorded income in percent of o¢ cial GDP.
Considering the interest rate as an opportunity cost of holding money, we expect a positive and
statistically signicant relationship between ln r and lnV . However, many developing countries have
followed policies based on a regulated interest rate. Therefore, the interest rate might not correspond
to the opportunity cost of holding money. Hence, the expected rate of ination (Ett+1) could be
preferred to the nominal interest rate to explain asset substitution between real assets and money
(Driscoll and Lahiri, 1983; Akhtaruzzaman, 2008)9. The expected sign of anticipated ination rate
is also positive, implying an inverse relationship with holdings and a direct relationship with the
velocity of money.
The sign of the correlation between money velocity and real per capita income may depend on
the stage of economic development (Fry, 1988). The initial stages in economic development are char-
acterized by increasing monetization of the economy, rapid expansion of monetary transactions and
relatively higher demand for money. The income elasticity of money demand becomes highly elastic
and the velocity of money is likely to decrease. Di¤erently, the advanced stages are characterized by
transaction e¢ ciency, nancial innovation, and technological progress which ensure the availability
of a wide range of money substitutes. The demand for currency decreases with an acceleration in
growth. Therefore, at the initial stage of economic development, we expect a negative correlation
between velocity and income but at a later stage, the relationship has presumably a positive sign.
8 In several studies, additional factors (like age, urbanization of the population, size of the agricultural sector,
nancial development) that may a¤ect money demand behaviour and hence, velocity of money, have been examined
(Graves, 1980; Driscoll and Lahiri, 1983; Akhtaruzzaman, 2008).
9As a proxy for the expected ination rate for the period t+1 we adopt the actual ination rate at time t (Ravenna
and Seppala, 2007).
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Finally, according to the literature on the CDA, we expect a negative relationship between the
velocity of money and the relative size of unrecorded economy. This hypothesis is based on the
assumption that transactions in the unobserved sector are paid in cash, so as to leave no observable
traces for the tax authorities. Therefore, the expected sign for the unrecorded income is negative,
implying a direct relationship with the demand for currency and an inverse relationship with velocity
of circulation of money.
3 Data description and methodology
Estimates of unrecorded income are obtained through the MTE approach.10 The velocity of cir-
culation of money is the ratio between the nominal o¢ cial GDP (source: United Nations) and the
average annual stock of narrow money (source: International Monetary Found). Data on money
market rates, treasury bill rates, and deposit rates are taken from International Monetary Found.11
The ination rate is the annual growth rate of Consumer Price Index (source: United Nations).
Figures of per capita real GDP are taken from United Nations.
Given the availability of data on money demand and interest rates, we use a panel of 40 countries
over the period 1981-2005.12 The choice of the econometric methodology is, therefore, based on a
preliminary stationarity analysis of the variables lnV; ln r; lnEtt+1; ln y and ln sh. First, we adopt
the Pesaran test for the null of unit root in heterogeneous and unbalanced panels with cross-sectional
10To measure the share of unobserved economy in a large panel of countries, we have used the two-stage MTE
procedure proposed by Eilat and Zinnes (2002). First, we have ltered the series of electricity consumption growth to
remove the inuence of changes in the weight of the industry sector and in relative electricity prices. Our framework
is based on the assumption that changes in real price of electricity (in terms of other domestically produced goods)
capture the e¤ects of supply shocks and of long term e¢ ciency gains caused by technical change. These factors are
likely to a¤ect electricity prices in all market economies. Di¤erently, changes in the industry share of GDP a¤ect
that part of electricity consumption which is directly related to the country-specic evolution in the composition of
domestic output, possibly due to di¤erent stages of economic development. Second, we have obtained the growth
rate of the unobserved economy by subtracting the growth rate of the o¢ cial economy from the ltered series of
electricity consumption growth - where the latter proxies the growth rate of the overall economy. Finally, by applying
the estimated changes of unrecorded income to pre-existing base-year gures we have obtained our estimates of the
unobserved economy. We have chosen base-year gures that have been largely used in the academic literature. In
particular, we have adopted the macroelectric estimates of Johnson et al. (1997)- for the transition economies- and
Lacko (1996, 1998)- for the OECD and Developing countries.
11 In the absence of available data on money market rate, we use the treasury bill rate or, alternatively, the deposit
rate.
12Countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, Morocco, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
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dependence of the error terms (Pesaran, 2003, 2007). The Pesaran test rejects the null of unit root
even if only one series is stationary. Thus, we also perform individual KPSS tests for the null of
stationarity (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992).
The presence of cointegrating relationships between lnV; ln r (or lnEtt+1), ln y and ln sh is
detected by using the residual-based procedure developed by Pedroni (1999, 2004). The Pedroni
group tests have a null of no cointegration for all countries of the panel against the alternative
hypothesis of cointegration for at least one country. These tests are based on the assumption of
errors cross sectional independence. Following Pedroni (2004), to eliminate some forms of cross-
sectional dependence, we include common time dummies in the regression equation.
Given the presence of cointegrated time series, we estimate the velocity of money by using the
group-mean panel Fully Modied Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method proposed by Pedroni
(2000, 2001). The group-mean FMOLS estimator (based on the between dimension of the panel) is
the simple average of individual FMOLS estimators. This estimator allows for the heterogeneity of
the panel, for the e¤ects of autocorrelation of the errors, and for the potential long-run endogeneity
of the regressors. As noted by Pedroni (2000, 2001), the group-mean FMOLS estimator may su¤er
from size distortions in the presence of cross-sectional dependence of the errors. Thus, in order
to eliminate some forms of cross-sectional dependence, we include common time dummies in the
regression equation.
4 Results
According to the Pesaran test, only for the variables lnV and ln y we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that all the time series are not stationary. As reported in Table1, we nd evidence of stationarity for
the variables ln r, lnEtt+1 and ln sh. According to the separate KPSS tests, a signicant portion of
series of each relevant variable have a unit root. All the variables in rst di¤erences are stationary.
The results of the Pedroni group tests are reported in Table 2. We nd evidence of cointegrating
relationships between lnV; ln r (or lnEtt+1) ln y and ln sh. Given that the Pedroni cointegration
test statistics may su¤er from size distortions when the time dimension of the panel is not sig-
nicantly large with respect to the cross sectional dimension (Pedroni, 2004), we apply the same
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cointegration analysis to two subgroups of the panel with T > N .13 These additional tests conrm
the initial results. However, the test of Pedroni rejects the null of no cointegration even if the resid-
uals of a pooled OLS estimation of (6) are stationary only for one country. Therefore, to determine
whether the residuals of each of the 49 cross-sections of equation (6) are stationary we performed
separate ADF, Phillips-Perron and KPSS unit root tests. These values demonstrate that the OLS
residuals are stationary for a signicant portion of countries.
The FMOLS estimation results for the entire panel of countries are reported in Table 3. As
expected, the relationship between the velocity of circulation of money and the relative size of
unobserved economy is negative and statistically signicant. Also the inuence of per capita GDP
is negative and signicant. The relationship between money velocity and the nominal interest rate
is positive and signicant in the full model.
We repeat the estimation procedure by using the anticipated ination rate as an alternative
measure of opportunity cost of holding money. As reported in Table 4, the relationship between
money velocity and the relative size of unrecorded economy is still negative and statistically sig-
nicant. The relationship between the velocity of circulation of money and the expected rate of
ination is positive and statistically signicant, while the relationship between lnV and ln y is no
longer signicant.
The sub sample of 19 non OECD countries includes 9 countries characterized by episodes of
hyperination (ination rates = 40%).14 Specic episodes of hyperination, related to periods
of economic and nancial crisis, may lead to ambiguous results on the inuence of unobserved
economy on the velocity of money. To prove the robustness of our results, we therefore exclude
these 9 countries from the estimation procedure. The FMOLS estimation results for the sub panel
of 31 countries are reported in Table 5 (regressions 1 and 2). The velocity of money continues to
be negatively a¤ected by the relative size of unobserved sector. The coe¢ cients for ln y, ln r and
lnEtt+1 are positive and statistically signicant.
As noted by Pedroni (2000), the group-mean FMOLS estimator may su¤er from size distorsions
when N is large relative to T. Thus, we have splitted the sub panel of 31 economies in two smaller
groups of countries- 10 developing countries and 21 OECD economies- with T large relative to N.
13We have tested the presence of cointegration in 21 OECD countries and 10 non OECD countries.
14Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, and Venezuela.
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Table 5 reports the regression results for these two sub panels of countries. For the group of 10
developing countries (regressions 3 and 4), the relationship between lnV and ln sh continues to
be negative and statistically signicant. Adopting the anticipated ination rate, the relationship
between lnV and ln y is now negative and signicant. Considering the sub panel of 21 OECD
countries, as expected, the sign of unobserved economy is still negative (regression 5).15
5 Conclusions
The nature of the unobserved economy makes di¢ cult to measure its magnitude, and to use such
measures in econometric models designed to aid policy makers.
In this paper we use the MTE estimates presented in Onnis and Tirelli (2010) to analyze the
relationship between the velocity of circulation of money and the relative size of unobserved sector
in a panel of 40 countries for the period 1981-2005. We nd a negative and statistically signicant
relationship between the velocity of circulation of money and the relative size of unobserved economy.
This result is robust to sub-sample analysis. Conrming the plausible assumption that transactions
in the unobserved sector are carried out using cash, we also prove the validity of our MTE estimates
of unrecorded economy. Concluding, according to our expectation, the sign of unrecorded income
is negative, implying a direct relationship with holding cash and an inverse relationship with the
velocity of money.
15For the OECD countries we are not interested in the relationship between the velocity of circulation of money
and the expected ination rate.
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6 Tables
Table 1. Pesaran test for heterogeneous panels
H0: all the time series are not stationary; H1: at least one series is stationary
=individual linear trends
Pescadf Pescadf ( )
lnV  0:8  1:4
lnr  5:8  6:7
lnE  7:4  7:2
lny  0:8 2
lnsh  4:8  3:4
 lnV  9:4  6:5
 ln r  14:6  11:5
 lnE  12:9  3:7
 ln y  9:5  8:4
 ln sh  10:5  7:9
Note: The statistics are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal with a left hand side rejection
area. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at least at the 5 percent level of
signicance.
Table 2. Pedroni residual-based cointegration test
H0: no cointegration for all countries; H1: for at least one country there is cointegration
Group statistics (1) (2)
Rho   statistic 1:7 2:3
PP   statistic  6:2  3:6
ADF   statistic  2 2:9
Note: All reported values are asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. The Pedroni tests are
left-sided. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5 per cent
level of signicance.
(1) Equation 6 with lnr
(2) Equation 6 with lnEtt+1
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Table 3. FMOLS estimation
Dependent variable: lnV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln r 0:55 0:44 0:13 0:5
ln y  0:04  0:02
ln sh  2:37  2:48
countries 40 40 40 40
Note: Regressions with time dummies. t-stats (not reported) are for H0 : i = 0 for all i vs H1 : i 6= 0
for all i. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5 per cent level
of signicance.
Table 4. FMOLS estimation- alternative estimates with the expected ination rate
Dependent variable: lnV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnEtt+1 1:48 0:52 1:07 0:62
ln y 0:11 0:04
ln sh  2:44  1:89
countries 40 40 40 40
Note: Regressions with time dummies. t-stats (not reported) are for H0 : i = 0 for all i vs H1 : i 6= 0
for all i. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5 per cent level
of signicance.
Table 5. FMOLS estimation- sub panel analyses
Dependent variable: lnV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln r 2.6* 0.43* 3.25*
lnEtt+1 1.3* -0.3
ln y 0.17* 0.16* -0.06 -1.11* 0.31*
ln sh -1.58* -1.25* -1.32* -1.22* -4.45*
countries 31 31 10 10 21
Note: Regressions with time dummies. t-stats (not reported) are for H0 : i = 0 for all i vs H1 : i 6= 0
for all i. A * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at least at the 5 per cent level
11
of signicance.
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